T hree decades ago Richard Titmuss, one of the architects of the British National Health Service, published a remarkable study. 1 He compared two systems for collecting and distributing human blood. One, a commercial for-profit approach widely used at that time in the US, the other, a voluntary nonprofit system organized around what he termed a "gift relationship" between donor and recipient. His striking findings, that the noncommercial approach was safer and more efficient, defied conventional economic wisdom. It cost 5 to 15 times more to collect, 1000% more blood was wasted despite more frequent shortages, and the incidence of transfusion-related infections, such as hepatitis, was significantly increased when blood distribution was entrusted to a for-profit market. 1 A similar warning should be sounded for those who would trust hospital care to the marketplace. Research showing that for-profit hospitals raise costs, 2,3 is now joined by a study by Thomas and colleagues in this month's JGIM suggesting that for-profits are also less safe. 4 While hardly the last word on this controversy, this examination of preventable adverse events in 15,000 patients in Utah and Colorado adds to our understanding of the epidemiology and differences of undesirable outcomes among varying hospitals. Given intense public interest and debate about both medical errors and hospital financing, the study is timely and relevant.
The current study relating hospital ownership and adverse events has its origins in the Harvard Malpractice Study. 5, 6 After failing to secure permission to study Massachusetts hospitals, the Harvard team, which included current study co-author Brennan, found a receptive New York State Health Department official who commissioned a landmark study of 31,000 randomly sampled charts of patients hospitalized in 1984. 6 Widely quoted estimates of 98,000 preventable annual deaths from medical errors derive from extrapolations of the Harvard team's findings: 3.7% of all patients hospitalized in New York experienced adverse events. Most were judged to be preventable, with one-quarter (1%) due to "negligence." This incidence is nearly identical to that found a decade earlier in a survey of 20,000 inpatients in California in the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study (4.6% adverse event rate; 0.8% negligence) 7 and in the current Thomas study, which reviewed 1992 Utah/Colorado hospitalizations (3.9% adverse events; 1.2% negligence). 4 Despite the consistent and ubiquitous occurrence of such errors, variations were noted. In the Harvard study, uninsured patients had double the risk of suffering medical injury due to substandard care. Black and lowerincome patients were also at significantly higher risk. 8 Hospitals' event rates varied from 0.2% to 7.9%. Teaching hospitals tended to have higher total event rates, but lower percentages of negligence compared with nonteaching and proprietary hospitals. While for-profits appeared to have lower event rates, their numbers in New York in 1984 were too small to draw meaningful comparisons. 9 The current study from two states with a larger number of for-profit hospitals sheds new light. Comparing major teaching and not-for-profit hospitals with for-profit and nonteaching (or "minor teaching") hospitals, the authors found significant advantages for patients in not-forprofit and teaching institutions. While it would be a mistake to overinterpret these findings as differences between the groups for various measures were small, methods for classifying hospitals were somewhat arbitrary, and physician chart reviewers' judgements about errors and negligence were implicit and subjective, it would also be an error to ignore their message.
Something is wrong in our nation's hospitals. While hospitals are fatally injuring more people than are killed by automobiles and firearms, at a cost that is as large as caring for people with HIV/AIDS, 10 hospital managers and even medical staffs appear more preoccupied with survival in the marketplace than the survival of their patients. This is a marketplace where hospitals and health plans would supposedly compete based on quality and where report cards would stimulate zealous efforts to enhance quality. Yet the signs abound that such report cards have failed and that the market is blind to all but the financial outcomes. 3, [11] [12] [13] [14] Consider nurses. We need look no further for one possible explanation of Thomas' study findings than the nurses' station down the hall. But nurses seem largely invisible to researchers: I could find not a single article about the role of inpatient staff nurses in JGIM , other than deploying them to help evaluate physicians! 15 Nurses play a pivotal role in error detection and prevention-intercepting erroneous orders, recognizing subtle changes in patients' mental status, uncovering critical allergies, transcribing orders and administering increasingly potent medications, minute-to-minute communication with patient and family, not to mention hands-on care of every wound and orifice of increasingly sick, frail patients. 16, 17 One well-documented characteristic of for-profit hospitals is lower staffing and expenditures for nursing. Unfortunately, this distinction is eroding as not-for-profits and academic centers increasingly emulate the for-profits by hiring management consultants whose first job is often to implement schemes for the downsizing and downgrading of nursing. Absent from their financial spreadsheets are indicators of the impact of fewer experienced nurses at the bedside. 18, 19 Not only is money the mission, it is also the metric. This is not simply due to venal, greed-inspired administrators and consultants, but results from profound difficulties in developing quality yardsticks. One problem with negligent adverse events occurring at the rate of 1% is that they're just too darned infrequent! Methods for reliably identifying adverse events are extremely labor intensive: retrospective (as in the Thomas study) or concurrent manual chart reviews and/or daily unit surveillance are seldom feasible in routine practice. Automated screens and efforts to use predictive models to target high-risk patients have been developed, but fall short of desired sensitivity for detecting the full spectrum of errors, and lack specificity to avoid unnecessary reviews or staff defensiveness. 20, 21 Moreover, why not direct such efforts to automate error detection to prevent errors before they happen? This is the real goal, but it also confuses counting.
Measurement is further complicated by the market. Try to imagine report card competition on lowest error rates. As the most conscientious adverse drug reaction reporter in my hospital, should I be branded as the institution's worst prescriber? Should a hospital replete with faithful reporters be put out of business?
Nonetheless, there are hopeful signs. 22, 23 Public awareness and demands for change are growing. Two national Annenberg Errors in Medicine Conferences have catapulted hundreds of participants and the entire field to a higher level of understanding. 24 These insights are being translated into action by such initiatives as the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) Collaboratives on Reducing Error, the American Medical Association's National Safety Foundation, the Veterans Hospitals' Safety Event Registry, the Institute for Safe Medication Practice (IMSP) and US Pharmacopia's reporting programs, which are now joined by a flurry of responses to the highly-publicized Institute of Medicine (IOM) report. 23, 25, 26 It is noteworthy that each of these efforts and innovations originate from public and voluntary sector initiatives. To paraphrase the title of the IOM report-to care is human. To profit is not-if it comes at the expense of suffering, or reaps reward from the denial of care, or even merely distracts us from our patient care improvement mission, it should be considered malpractice.-G ORDON S CHIFF , MD, Cook County Hospital, Chicago, Ill.
